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TORT LAW IN MIDSTREAM: ITS CHALLENGE TO THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS*
By FTEMING JAMS, JR.**
THE QUEST FOR AN INTEGRATING PRINCIPLE IN TORTs: A PURSUIT
OF FUTILITY
WHEN I was a first year law student I was often asked to explain what was
meant by the word "torts," which was of course the name of one of my
courses. This drove me to a law dictionary where I found tort defined as breach
of a duty not arising out of contract. This is certainly not a very helpful defini-
tion. It suggests a simple dichotomy of duties or obligations into those we
voluntarily assume by contract or agreement, and those that are thrust upon
us by law whether we like it or not. This is a vastly oversimplified picture-
neither the division nor the description of the parts into which the whole is
divided will bear close analysis.1 Yet it is not without usefulness, and it may
well serve as our starting point so far as the nature of torts is concerned; for
by and large-in the gross so to speak-the law of torts has historically dealt
with duties and obligations that society imposes on its individual members for
one reason or another having little to do with the individual's consent, though
they may indeed be imposed as conditions-often unwanted conditions-upon
action voluntarily undertaken (like driving a car or running a business).
It is obvious at once that this covers a heterogeneous mass of stuff. There
are countless different reasons why society may decide to impose duties on its
members under the infinite variety of situations that make up human life.
Thus the law of torts is generally thought of as including assault and battery,
false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, trespass to realty, the amorphous
tort of nuisance, trespass to personalty and conversion, fraud and deceit, libel
and slander (whether involving a matter between neighbors or defamation by a
giant newspaper chain or broadcasting network), a good deal of what is called
unfair competition among business men, and, most prominent of all today, the
many facets of accident law. Even this is not a complete listing.
This heterogeneous law of torts did not grow up because it was inspired by
any one integrating principle. Under the formulary system of the common law
its growth was piecemeal and fragmented. The roots of some torts are lost in
antiquity.2 Others are relatively modern.3 The result is a hodge-podge.
*The James McCormick Mitchell Lectures, delivered at the University of Buffalo
School of Law, April 3-4, 1959.
**Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. See Seavey, Book Review, 45 HARv. L. REV. 209 (1931); FLEMMG, LAW or TORTS
1-3 (1957); cf. WINIED, PROVrnCE or T E LAW OF TORT (1931).
2. 1 STREET, FoUNDATIONs OF LEGaL LiAr~rn chs. 1, 2, 3 (1906).
3. The outstanding dramatic example is the recognition of the right of privacy.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK Or TiE LAW OF TORTS 635 (2d ed. 1955). See also Lumley v. Gye,
2 El. & BI. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (K.B. 1853); Temperton v. Russell [1893] 1 Q.B. 715;
Ratdliffe v. Evans [1892] Q.B. 524, which were pioneer cases in the expanding subject of
tortious interference with economic relations. And negligence as a tort is no older than
the 18th century. 1 S=ET, op. cit. supra note 2, 183-187.
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Yet ever since the law was liberated from the procedural shackles of the
forms of action, there has been a strong school of thought which has sought to
find, or to construct, a unifying principle which would give integrity to the
whole law of torts.4
On the other hand there has been a competing school which has denied the
possibility or the utility of such a quest and has kept insisting on the frag-
mented nature of the subject, which it regards as a group of isolated torts, and
often as a closed cycle.5 This school more accurately reflects history but this in
itself is no reason why its view should be perpetuated.
If one leaves the heterogeneous nature of the situations covered by the law
of torts and seeks to find principles of liability applied in them, it is easily pos-
sible so to classify these principles as to reduce their number drastically. The
usual number is three. According to the prevailing classification liability may
be based on
1. The intent to inflict injury,
2. The negligent infliction of injury or on
3. Mere voluntary action or activity causing injury. That is to say that
some acts or activities, although they are perfectly lawful, are engaged in at our
own peril so far as liability for injurious consequences is concerned.
It will be seen that one underlying notion does run through all of these
principles. A voluntary act is required 7 and this must be either an affirmative
act or activity, or an omission in carrying out an act, activity, or undertaking.
Otherwise the failure to confer a benefit has not generally been regarded as a
tort.8 And simply being at the expense of another has never been regarded as a
tort.
As the nineteenth century wore on, accident law emerged as the dominant
branch of the law of torts, and fault (usually the fault of negligence) emerged
as the dominant motif in accident law. This meant a relaxation of some of the
stricter aspects of older liability. As Leon Green puts it:
"The concern of centuries for the injured party was transferred to
the offending party, for whom the common law had theretofore shown
slight consideration." 9
This shift is explainable by the economic changes accompanying the industrial
revolution and our common desire to free activity and enterprise from bur-
4. WIN-nID ON TORTS § 7 (6th ed. 1954 per T.E. Lewis); cf. PoLLOcK, LAW or TORTS
16-18 (15th ed. 1951 per PA. Landon).
5. SAT OND, LAW or TORTS 9 (6th ed. 1924) (this was the last edition prepared by
Salmond); cf. id. 17-19 (12th ed. 1957, per R.F.V. Heuston). Compare also POLLOCx,
LAW or TORTS, Excursus A, p. 40 (15th ed. 1951, per PA. Landon).
6. PROSSER, HANDBOOK or THE LAW or TORTS 24 (2d ed. 1955). Cf. HARPER, A
TREATisE ON TnE LAW or TORTS §§ 4-7 (1933) (listing intent, negligence, and "extrahaz-
ardous conduct" as the kinds of conduct required to constitute a basis of tort liability).
7. RESTATEmENT, TORTS §2 (1934).
8. McNiece and Thornton, Afirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272 (1949);
HARPER & JA.ES, LAW OF TORTS §18.6 (1956).
9. GREEN, TRArmc Vicrims: TORT LAW AND INSURANCE 13 (1958).
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dens.' 0 It was quite in keeping with the notions of individualism and laissez
faire, which then became current, to regard fault as the normal basis of liability.
It was the job of self-reliant individuals to look out for themselves so far as the
ordinary risks of desirable activity were concerned. Only when activity was
antisocial or unreasonably dangerous should the actor be held.
It was natural then that those who sought a unifying principle in torts
should find it in fault which included negligence and the intentional infliction of
injury." Instances of strict liability were viewed as exceptions and generally as
exceptions to be disparaged and narrowed. Of the famous decision in Rylands
v. Fletcher'2 which involved something of an extension of strict liability, Salmond
said "No decision in the law of torts has done more to prevent the establishment
of a simple, uniform, and intelligible system of civil responsibility."' 3
So fault was dominant. But the concept of legal fault is ambiguous. It
may be used to refer to personal blameworthiness-to the choice of a bad alter-
native by an actor who has two alternatives or more and at least one good one.
And that which makes the choice a bad one must be perceivable. "A choice
which entails a concealed consequence is, as to that consequence, no choice."' 4
In this sense the word fault has meaning both to the layman and in terms of
those values which the industrial revolution exalted. It still has meaning when
it is used to refer to conduct which is substandard or unreasonably dangerous
to the eye of the average reasonable man, even where the particular actor cannot
perceive the danger or take the needed precaution, because he is dull or awk-
ward.
But legal fault may be given a much more mechanical meaning. It may
mean simply the failure to meet a legal standard, and such failure may often
be quite a neutral thing so far as personal blameworthiness is concerned. Thus
a man who uses land' 5 or a chattel' 6 in the honest and reasonable belief that it
is his own incurs legal liability if he is mistaken in that belief. He has we say
been "guilty" of trespass or conversion. He has committed a legal wrong. The
10. Id. ch. 1. According to Dean Green this was not due primarily to any deep sense
of morality, nor to a capturing of the judicial process by a dominant economic class, but
rather to the stake we all felt we had in the industrial revolution and in the free use of
improved highways. "We of that period desired the good things of life that a bounteous
new industrial world and the ingenuity and labor of vigorous men and women could afford.
We were willing to pay the price, to share the risks, even more to sacrifice the individual
in order to achieve our ends." Id. at 31.
11. Pound, The Economic Interpretation of the Law of Torts, 53 HAxv. L. Rxv. 365,
377-378 (1940).
12. 3 Hurl. & C. 774 (Ex. 1865), L.R. 1 Ex. Cas. 265 (Ex. Ch. 1866), L.R. 3 H.L.
330 (1868).
13. SAIMOND, LAW OF TORTS 20 (12th ed. 1957 per R.F.V. Heuston).
14. HomrEs, TnE ComaoN LAw 94 (1881).
15. REsTATmNT, ToRTs §164 and comments (1934).
16. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 Coma. L.Q. 168, 175, 176 (1957) ; REsTATE-
IMNT, ToRTs §§244-246 (1934).
New York courts, adopting a minority rule, hold that the innocent purchaser from a
wrongdoer must first be informed of the defect in his title and given a chance to restore
the chattel to the true owner before he becomes a converter, unless, of course, such demand
and refusal would be futile. Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874); Prosser, op. cit. supra
at 176 note 32.
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same thing may be said of the motorist whose brakes fail because of some latent
undiscoverable defect in the mechanism, if a statute requires brakes that
work; 17 or of the retailer who sells impure food in a sealed container of unsus-
picious appearance which he got from a reputable supplier.18 We vary the figure
of speech slightly when we "impute" the wrong of a servant to his altogether
blameless master.' 9 It is clear, I think, that in cases like these liability is strict
in the sense that the careful, conscientious man could not avoid it by using the
knowledge and perception open to him when he acted. If the language of fault
is used to describe such cases, doctrinal unity may perhaps be attained, but it
is attained by a play on words.
Even in the heyday of fault, however, the imposition of strict liability was
not always concealed by a facile attribution of "legal fault" to the actor, wit-
ness Rylands v. Fletcher. °
Fault then was not the universal solvent of all tort problems even when its
dominance was well-nigh unchallenged; it certainly is not today.
Recently there has been a rather interesting attempt to find common de-
nominators in the elements of the tort cause of action. The common elements,
it is said, are damages to the plaintiff, causal relation, duty, and breach of duty
by the defendant.2 ' But the attempt yields more of interest than it does of
satisfaction. For one thing, resulting damage is not required in all torts, 22 and
this objection is scarcely met by resurrecting the hoary fiction of presumed
damage. A more serious flaw in the usefulness of this analysis concerns the
element of duty. If we assume for a moment that duty is indeed a common
denominator in all torts, we are not helped very much. In a case of any dif-
ficulty or novelty the real question is whether a duty is to be imposed; and
this at once reminds us of all the manifold reasons why society should or should
not impose non-consensual obligations in the infinitely variable types of situa-
tions covered by the law of torts. The lack of a common thread here is not
supplied by focussing on the concept of duty instead of the concept of torts.
A moment ago we assumed that duty is a common element in all torts. This
is often said-indeed I spoke that way myself at the beginning of this lecture.
But let us look more closely at this assumption.
When we speak of duty or obligation as non-lawyers we ordinarily mean
a command or a prohibition imposed by law, morals, or religion. 23 Duty is re-
lated to oughtness according to some recognized standard. We have a duty to
do that which we ought to do or should do. And the assumption also is that
performance of duty lies within the realm of the possible. Breach of duty has
17. See, e.g., Madison v. Morovitz, 122 Conn. 208, 188 AtI. 665 (1936).
18. Burkhardt v. Armour & Co., 115 Conn. 249, 161 Ad. 385 (1932); Ryan v. Pro-
gressive Grocery Stores, Inc., 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
19. See Bellefontaine & I.R.R. v. Snyder, 24 Oh. St. 670, 676 (1874); 2 HARPER &
JrAms, LAW o" TORTS §26.3 (1956).
20. Note 12, supra.
21. Ward, The Tort Cause of Action, 42 Com. L.Q. 28 (1956).
22. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §907 (1939).
23. But cf. OLIVECRONA, LAW AS FACT (1939).
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aptly been described in the Episcopal prayer book: "We have left undone those
things which we ought to have done, and we have done those things which we
ought not to have done." 24 In the law of torts also this is the usual notion of
duty-though of course the law is concerned only with legal duties and not all
those which may derive from morals or religion. When these duties concern
conduct outside the processes of civil litigation (or the presentation and settle-
ment of legal claims) they may be called for convenience primary duties. Thus
I am under a primary duty not to assault my neighbor. I owe my fellow high-
way traveler the primary duty to use care in driving my automobile. And so on.
If I violate one of my primary duties and injure someone I may then come
under a new and different type of duty, a duty to pay damages, which may be
enforced by the process of civil litigation or the threat of it. Let us call this
kind of duty "secondary."2 5
It is perfectly clear, I suppose, that whenever you have liability in tort you
have a secondary duty. It is true, but it is also tautologous. It helps us no
more than it does to know that in all successful tort actions there has been a
tort. A more important question is whether you always have a primary duty.
Let us look for example at a case like Rylands v. Fletcher2 6 or the case of the
careful employer. In Rylands the defendant built a reservoir' on land he had
under lease. So far as he was concerned he used all due care. 7 Unknown to
him, however, there were shafts of an old mine under his reservoir and these led
to plaintiff's mine. After defendant had impounded water in his reservoir the
old shafts gave way and plaintiff's mine was flooded and rendered unworkable.
In spite of defendant's admitted freedom from fault of every kind, the courts
imposed liability upon him. Where is the primary duty in a case like that? One
can readily be formulated as it was by Blackburn, J., in the Exchequer Chamber:
"[T]he person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and
keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it at his
peril.128 At another place he calls this "an absolute duty to keep it in at his
peril."29 But given the water on the land and the other circumstances of the
case, this duty was impossible of fulfillment by one excusably ignorant of the
danger against which omniscience might have taken further precautions. Of
course defendant could have avoided the injury by not creating the reservoir.
24. From the General Confession.
25. Cf. HoHrInD, FuND AmzTAL LEGAL CoNcEmoNs 101 (1923).
26. Note 12, supra.
27. It appears from the report of the case that the independent contractor who con-
structed the reservoir observed the shafts and, although they were filled up with soil like
that surrounding them, he was probably negligent in failing to realize the danger and take
further precautions. Today most courts would hold defendant liable for this negligence
of his independent contractor; but at the time of the decision the courts bad not yet devel-
oped an appropriate exception to the owner's immunity from liability for his independent
contractor's acts. So most of the judges assumed that liability of defendant could not be
based on the negligence of the independent contractor. See Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands
v. Fletcher, 59 U. op P. L. REv. 298, 299 (1911).
28. L.R. 1 Ex. Cas. at 279.
29. Ibid.
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But that was a lawful activity and he was conducting it carefully. There was
nothing then that defendant could and should have done that he failed to do;
nothing he did that he should not have done.
The same thing is true of the careful employer who is held liable for the
casual negligence of his employee. Even if he has adopted all the training de-
vices and safety measures known to man and used the utmost human care in
selecting his employee, he will be held vicariously liable for injury caused by
the employee's momentary oversight so long as the employee is acting within
the scope of his employment. Again there is nothing that the employer could
and should do that he has left undone; nothing he did that he should not have
done.
It is apparent then that the law of torts will sometimes impose the sec-
ondary duty to pay damages without insisting on the breach of a primary duty.
In other words the law sometimes says to a man: "You may engage in a certain
activity if you do it carefully. In fact it is in the social interest that you do so.
Yet if you do so, however carefully, you must pay for all injuries which that
activity causes to other people." The principles of liability which will justify
such a result may well be quite different from those which justify imposing
liability on a man who has violated a primary duty and caused an injury by his
wrong. Duty then is seen to be an ambiguous term, just as fault is. It will
serve no better, as a meaningful integrating principle of tort liability.
The truth is there is no single integrating principle of tort liability save one
so broad that it answers nothing, though it may suggest fruitful inquiries.
And is not this inevitable?
Remember what torts are: those various heterogeneous instances where the
law has sought to impose liability on people for real or supposed reasons of
policy, without much regard to their consent. These instances cover the spectrum
of human affairs. They touch matters of individual privacy, things that happen
within a family; uses of neighboring land that interfere with each other; the
incidents of public and private transportation; fights, affrays, and brawls; com-
petition among business; police activities; the content of newspapers and broad-
casts; industrial and other work accidents, and so on. Why should we not expect
the agencies of the law-courts and legislatures-to have many different reasons
for imposing liability under so many different circumstances, stressing deterrence
here, compensation there; expediency here, morals there; concern for the in-
dividual here, subordinating it there? All with only this one common denom-
inator: in each case the court or legislature must try to weigh the considerations
of social welfare which favor or oppose liability and strike a balance according
to its best judgment.
The lack of a unifying principle in torts does not mean, however, that we
must fragment the field in the same way that the common law forms of action
did; surely it does not mean that the law of torts represents a closed cycle to
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which nothing new may be added. Nor does it mean that we should abandon
the quest for the fundamental common concepts of liability.
Earlier we saw that it is the modern fashion to find three fundamental
bases of tort liability: intent, negligence, and strict liability. This is a perfectly
defensible form of statement but I find it unsatisfactory for one reason. It
seems to me that the category of "strict liability" covers two distinct strains
which have different origins and serve quite different ends. One is a very old
strain. When the central government in England was in the making, the law of
torts consisted in simple, very specific commands and prohibitions, with few if
any exceptions or defenses. 30 A primary purpose of these rules was to control
behavior and keep peace. The touchstone of tort liability was breach of a rule
-unlawfulness in that sense, but an unlawfulness which might be quite devoid
of fault as we are using that term. While this mechanical kind of unlawfulness
is one of the oldest touchstones of liability, it has not been abandoned and still
has vitality as one source of strict liability today.
But modern strict liability stems in part from an entirely different source
whose older strains are emanations from notions of unjust enrichment 3' and
eminent domain (though this connection is often unperceived), which have
more recently become mixed with what may loosely be called the principle of
insurance, by which I mean the principle which recognizes that broad distribu-
tion of a loss diminishes its disutility or human hardship, although of course it
cannot diminish the loss. 3 2
This ground of liability does not involve fault or even mechanical unlaw-
fulness in any sense. It requires no breach of primary duty. Rather it involves
a recognition of two things: (1) that the actor in a perfectly lawful and socially
desirable but dangerous activity may fairly be asked to compensate the victims
of the danger inevitably accompanying his activity, and (2) that such an actor
is usually able today to distribute these losses widely among the beneficiaries
of the activity and that the social disutility of the loss is thereby diminished.
I propose, then, to classify the principles of tort liability as:
1. Unlawfulness resulting in injury.
2. Intentional infliction of injury.
3. Negligent infliction of injury.
4. Strict liability imposed in spite of the absence of unlawfulness or fault,
for reasons of policy.
This last is perhaps not so much a principle of liability in its traditional
sense (which for centuries has been individualized) as it is a principle of al-
locating losses in the social interest. But the modem law of torts is becoming
increasingly influenced by this principle (though often this does not appear on
30. Stone, Touchstones of Tort Liability, 2 STAx. L. R.v. 259, 260 (1950).
31. See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARv. L. REv. 401, 410
(1959).
32. See 2 HARPER & JAI S, LAW OF TOR'S ch. 13 (1956).
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the surface) and it would be fatuous to consider that law without taking the
principle into account.
Having set forth the basic principles of tort liability, let us next see some-
thing of the way each one is applied in the situations covered by tort law. In
doing so, we need not inquire whether any one of these principles will account
for all the cases in which tort liability is imposed. Obviously it will not. We
should, however, ask whether these principles are uniformly applied-whether
they mean the same things and carry the same consequences whenever they are
invoked.
Unlawfulness. This we have seen involves disobedience to a specific com-
mand or prohibition. It is found in many of the familiar common law torts:
the law of trespass forbade a man to enter his neighbor's close, to meddle with
his chattels, to bring force directly to bear on his person, or to detain him by
force or threat of force. The law of libel forbade the publication of a statement
defamatory in its effect. Liability in some of these cases persists. In addition
many police regulations like traffic laws have been enacted by legislatures and
some new specific commands and prohibitions devised by courts.
The disobedience which constitutes unlawfulness may involve intent to
hurt or negligence, and so it often overlaps these bases of liability and serves in
an auxiliary capacity (as by prescribing a standard of conduct which a jury
might otherwise be free to reject) .a But, as we have seen, unlawfulness may
serve as an independent basis of liability when there is no personal blameworth-
iness. You will recall the examples of the reasonably mistaken trespasser on land
and of the motorist with a brake defect he could not know about. In other
words society may regard some of its commands as so important that it makes
them peremptory and unqualified. The question remains whether the faultless
violation of such a command (or prohibition) will uniformly subject the violator
to tort liability. The legislature may provide that it shall,3 4 and if it does the
provision will be given effect. If it does not-that is, if the statute merely pro-
vides for a fine or other criminal penalty-then American courts differ on the
question. Some do hold the faultless violator subject to civil liability,35 others
do not,3 6 still others will allow the violator to avoid liability if he can show one
of certain excuses for violation3 7 (even though the excuse would not remove the
unlawfulness). A majority of our courts embrace one of the two last described
solutions 38
33. Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REv. 317 (1913); Lowndes,
Civil Liability by Criminal Legislation, 16 MiNN. L. Rav. 361 (1931); Morris, Criminal
Statutes and Tort Liability, 46 HARv. L. Rav. 453 (1932); Morris, The Role of Criminal
Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 CoLram. L. Rv. 21 (1949).
34. 2 HARPER & JAmES, LAW Or TORTS §17.5 (1956).
35. See, e.g., Andrew v. White Line Bus Corp., 115 Conn. 464, 161 Alt. 799 (1932).
36. Hanlon v. Southern Boston R.R., 129 Mass. 310 (1879); Landry v. Hubert, 101
Vt. 111, 141 At. 593 (1928). Cf. Combs v. Los Angeles Ry., 29 Cal.2d 606, 177 P.2d 293
(1947).
37. See, e.g., Taber v. Smith, 26 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Bissell v. Seattle
Vancouver Motor Freight, 25 Wash. 2d 68, 168 P.2d 390 (1946).
38. Sources cited note 33, sipra; 2 HARPER & JAaE., LAw oF ToRTs §17.6 (1956).
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It is also true that an unlawful act does not create liability for harm of a
kind different from that which makes the act unlawful,39 but this would not
impair the general application of the principle if carefully stated.
Where a court sets up a specific command or prohibition40 it has of course
the power to visit liability mechanically upon the violator, but the trend has in
fact been away from this kind of rigidity either through engrafting exceptions
and qualifications on the rule of command, or by letting it become merged in
the broad requirement of reasonable conduct which is applied by the jury.4 '
We cannot say then: whoever acts unlawfully and thereby injures another
is subject to liability for that injury. We find here no principle of general or
uniform application either as a rule of inclusion or one of exclusion. What we
have is simply a concept, or a principle, or a device for imposing liability which
sometimes is used and sometimes is not.
Intent. Like so many words we have used thus far "intent" is an am-
biguous one. When we say that A intentionally cut B's trees we may mean that
A did so knowing the trees belonged to B and therefore contemplated the injury
to B as the desired or at least inevitable result of what he did. Or we may mean
simply that he intended the cutting-a meaning which would be perfectly con-
sistent with excusable ignorance of any injury to B. In many of the familiar
torts which are commonly classed as intentional, intent in the latter sense is all
that is required. Thus for trespass to real or personal property, for conversion,
for libel, no intent to bring about injury or even to interfere with plaintiff's
property42 or reputation43 is needed. It is enough that defendant intended the
act that constituted the interference. Now the books are full of situations where
intent to do the very act which in fact results in injury does not make the actor
liable.4 4 Such intent could surely not be erected into a general principle of
liability. Indeed I suggest that the real basis of liability in most of the so-called
intentional torts is unlawfulness rather- than intent.
A different and a harder question is posed when we come to an intent to
inflict the injury. Yet it is perfectly clear that injuries may sometimes be in-
39. Gorris v. Scott, L.R. 9 Ex. Cas. 125 (1874). Cf. Klein v. Herlim Realty Co., 184
Misc. 852, 54 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup.Ct. Bronx Co. 1945).
40. As in Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927); Benner v. Philadel-
phia & R.Ry., 262 Pa. 307, 105 A.2d 283 (1918).
41. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation, 3 LAw
& CONTrEMP. PR. 476 (1936).
42. RESTATEmENT, TORTS §164 comment a (1934).
43. Hulton & Co. v. Jones [1909) 2 K.B. 44, aff'd, -[1910] A.C. 20. See Holdsworth,
A Clapter of Accidents in the Law of Libel, 57 L.Q. REv. 74 (1941).
American cases looking in the same direction are Washington Post Co. v. Kennedy,
3 F.2d 207 (D.C.Cir. 1925); Switzer v. Anthony, 71 Colo. 291, 206 Pac. 391 (1922); Whit-
comb v. Hearst Corp., 329 Mass. 193, 107 N.E.2d 295 (1952); Laudati v. Stea, 44 R.I. 303,
117 Atl. 422 (1922) ("The question is not who was aimed at, but who was hit.").
44. Examples would be cases where a man driving carefully turns his car to avoid a
child darting out and runs into a parked car before he can stop; cases where a man creates
precisely the condition of the premises which in fact causes an injury although the con-
dition is not unreasonably dangerous, and so on. See also Gould v. Slater Woolen Co.,
147 Mass. 315, 17 N.E. 531 (1888) ; Poplar v. Bourjois, Inc., 272 App. Div. 74, 69 N.Y.S.2d
252 (1st Dept. 1947); Bennett v. Pilot Prod. Co., 120 Utah 474, 235 P.2d 525 (1951).
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tentionally inflicted without fear of liability. In the first place there are some
interests which the law does not protect. No action may be maintained for a
cruel social snub. And even where the injurious invasion is to an interest which
receives legal protection, there may be no liability. Our attitude towards busi-
ness competition and possible conflict between labor and management, for ex-
ample, is such that we permit many competitive methods45 and strikes under
many circumstances46 although the conduct is intended to inflict economic harm.
If then the intent to injure a legally protected interest is to be erected into
a generally applicable principle of liability it must include the qualification that
the intent to injure is without legal justification. Some commentators 47 and
some courts48 do indeed embrace this as a principle of general application;
others however reject it as an independent basis of liability altogether,4 9 while
still others accept it with qualifications.5 0
Negligence. The term negligence, too, involves ambiguity although per-
haps less than some other terms we have noted. It is often defined as conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm;51 conduct, that is, which would be seen by
the reasonably prudent actor to threaten unreasonable risk of harm to another.
As we have already noted,52 courts do not agree upon whether a standard pre-
scribed by a criminal statute is "established by law"-at least conclusively-
for the purpose of tort law. There is an ambiguity here. There may be others.
But the definition of negligence is itself so vague and covers so much ground
that the problems it involves-and they are many-seldom turn on the same
kind of definitional ambiguity. More often they are concerned with the weigh-
ing of facts and their evaluation in terms of legal consequences within the lati-
tude allowed and invited by the language used.
The next question is whether negligence is a principle of general applica-
tion. It is surely the dominant concept fn modern tort law. But can we say that
wherever a man's conduct has caused foreseeable and unreasonable harm he is
subject to liability for it? A casual examination of the subject shows that we
can not. For example:
If an able-bodied man makes no attempt to rescue a child from drowning
45. Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B. Div. 598 (1889), al'd,
[1892] A.C. 25.
46. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 742 (2d ed. 1955); Forkosch, The
Doctrine of Just Cause as Applied to Labor Cases, 23 TEMPLE L.Q. 178 (1950).
47. Pormocx, LAW OF TORTS 17, 18 (15th ed. 1951 per P.A. Landon); Forkosch, An
Analysis of the "Prinus Facie Tort" Cause of Action, 42 CORN. L.Q. 465 (1957).
48. See Skinner & Co. v. Shew & Co. [18931 1 Ch. 413, 422 (per Bowen, L.J.) ; Aikens
v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904) (per Holmes, J.); Advance Music Corp. v. American
Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. 79, 70 N.E.2d 401 (1946).
49. See Professor Landon's Excursus A in PoLLocic, LAWv OF TORTS 40-46 (15th ed.
1951); Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles (1895] A.C. 587.
50. Various qualifications are described in Forkosch, op. cit. supra note 47.
51. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §282 (1954).
52. Supra at notes 35-38.
TORT LAW IN MIDSTREAM
in what the man knows to be a pool of shallow water, there is probably no
liability.5 3
If a water company negligently fails to keep up the pressure in its system
many courts will not hold it liable for fire damage which could have been pre-
vented by proper pressure. Such is the law of New York.54
If an accountant makes a negligent audit of his client's accounts he is not
liable to a creditor who lends the client money on the faith of the financial state-
ment which because of the accountant's negligence pictures an insolvent busi-
ness as one worthy of credit.55
If a man makes a careless statement which disparages another's product
he is not liable for the harm that ensues.56
If the possessor of premises negligently allows them to become ruinous he
is generally not liable to trespassers and often not even to licensees, injured by
the ruinous condition.5 7
If I lend another my automobile I owe the borrower no duty of care in
inspecting or putting it in repair.58
If I sell or lease premises I am not liable to the lessee or vendee for in-
juries caused by negligent disrepair, unless I actually knew of the defect and
its danger, had reason to think the tenant or buyer would not observe it, and
concealed it from him.69
The list could be extended, but these instances will serve to illustrate the
point. By no stretch of the imagination can we regard negligence as a principle
of universal application.
Strict Liability. No one would contend that either courts or legislatures
uniformly apply principles of strict liability based on notions of unjust enrich-
ment or the insurance principle.
We have then no integrating principle in torts. We have, to be sure, prin-
ciples or bases of liability; but some of these are ambiguous and none of them,
with one possible and quite narrow exception, is a principle of general applica-
tion. The possible exception is the intentional infliction of injury without justi-
fication, and this has often been hedged about with qualifications. Moreover as
a practical matter it affects only a small segment of tort law.
A MORE FRUITFUL QUEST: SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR LONG
RANGE SOLUTIONS
If, now, the quest among the concepts is disappointing this may suggest
inquiry into the fats of the social problems with which the law of torts seeks
53. Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928).
54. Moch Co. v. Renssa]aer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Steitz
v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E.2d 704 (1945).
55. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
56. Dale System v. General Teleradio, 105 F.Supp. 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
57. PROSSER, HANDBOOR OF THE LAW OF TORTS ch. 15 (2d ed. 1955); 2 HAI PER &
JAMEs, LAW OF TORTS ch. 27 (1956).
53. Johnson v. H.M. Bullard Co., 95 Conn. 251, 111 AtU. 70 (1920).
59. Kilmer v. White, 254 N.Y. 64, 171 N.E. 908 (1950).
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to deal. I believe that it does, and that more help at the present juncture can
be had from classification and study of these problems in terms of their socially
significant facts, than can be had from conceptual classification and analysis.
This will not, of course, yield any integrating principle. Nor will it yield any
automatic solution of problems. Indeed when the factual analysis is done, the
work of laborers in the field of torts will be just begun. But it will, I suggest,
be more fruitful work, at least in those areas (and they are important ones)
where classification reflects an identifiable social problem.
There has been very little of this kind of factual sociological study made
in fields covered by the law of torts; none that I know of in most areas. There
have been significant studies in the fields of automobile accidents 0 and of in-
dustrial accidents,61 and that is about all.
Because I believe so strongly that studies like these are the greatest con-
tributions that can now be made to tort law I should like to indicate something
of the lines along which I suggest fruitful inquiry may be made.
The first thing any investigator will have to do is identify the area of study.
This should be indicated by the dimensions of a significant social problem, but
there may well be competing notions about these dimensions. This may be
partly a matter of statistics-are there enough situations having significant
common features to warrant studying them together? The question of what is
significant will necessarily turn in part on the investigator's hypothesis as to
solution. I have spoken of the studies of automobile accidents. Such an area
would be carved out for study on the hypothesis that automobile accidents may
properly be singled out for special treatment by the law, or possibly that they
will shed light on a broader area.
Scope once determined, the inquiry should concern itself with the fol-
lowing:
What kind of injury is suffered by those who will seek redress; what is the
value of the interest invaded; what is the frequency of the injury; what kinds
of people are injured; what are the consequences, economic, psychological,
social, of injury?
What kinds of redress are possible, appropriate, or preferable from the
point of view of best protecting the interest?
What are the kinds of behavior that lead to injury? Is that behavior part
of an activity or enterprise, or is it in each case simply an isolated instance?
Is the behavior which produces injury socially useful behavior; is it part
of a socially useful activity or enterprise?
Can such behavior be controlled? If so can it be controlled without in-
hibiting useful enterprise or activity?
How will the remedies which are effective to redress the injury work as
controls of the behavior which brings those injuries about?
60. Notes 62, 64 infra.
61. Note 63, infra; Report of the Wainwright Commission, N.Y. SawATE DociMxms
vol. xxv, No. 38 (1910).
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To what extent will a remedy tend to minimize the social disutility or
hardship of losses that occur? If a remedy will have a desirable trend in this
direction, will the benefit of this be offset by unwanted side-effects in dis-
couraging behavior and activity which we wish to encourage?
Such a study would obviously presuppose an examination of values whereby
one may rate conduct and results as desirable or undesirable; or else an assump-
tion of such values. In many situations, however, this would not be a major
stumbling block since there is fairly wide common acceptance of enough of the
values so that we would all be looking for many of the same things. Moreover
there would not have to be agreement as to the relative weight to be given dif-
ferent values before a study is justified. Competing claims among values can
be more intelligently discussed if we know as a matter of fact just how se-
riously an existing or proposed legal rule will affect them. Most of us would
agree, for instance, that monetary compensation to a man who has been injured
and has suffered financial loss as a result, is a desirable thing. Most of us would
also agree that it is an undesirable thing to impose liability for damages where
such imposition will tend to discourage lawful and useful activity. Now how-
ever much or little weight one would give these considerations on balance, the
weigher would be helped by knowing the extent of harm done to the victim and
to others by his loss if it should not be compensated; the extent to which that
harm is effectively minimized by compensation; the extent to which liability
would in fact discourage the activities of those on whom it may be imposed,
and so on.
The optimum legal rule for any given type of situation is one which will
best conserve and promote the values involved, with a proper balance between
competing ones. My thesis here is simply this: This is fundamentally a human,
economic, or social problem, not a legal one. The legal rules and techniques are
only means or tools for conserving or promoting the values selected as im-
portant in any given type of situation. The situations presented and the kinds
of problems they pose are infinitely varied. They call for different types of
solution and the use of different techniques; and this may be so even within
the confines of what has traditionally been thought of as a single tort.
There is another point I think is important. We have seen that there are
relatively few basic principles of liability in torts. Naturally then the same
ones will reappear in many different contexts. Negligence, for instance, may be
found an appropriate basis for liability in accident law, and also in the field of
misrepresentation of facts where commercial or business interests are at stake.
It does not follow, I submit, that the concept of negligence in the two different
contexts should be identical. The fact that we reject degrees of negligence in
one situation, for example, should not mean that we must necessarily reject
them in the other. Or, the willingness to accept contributory negligence as a
defense in one of these fields should not lead us blindly to accept it in the other.
We should not, in other words, be led astray by the pursuit of conceptual sym-
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metry. We should not only select but also adjust our tools to the particular job
in hand, and that is to be measured in terms of human needs and values and
not of legal concepts.
So much for general considerations.
Let us turn now to some of the studies which have actually been made and
see the lessons they teach. As I said before, the only studies I know of have been
in the field of accidental personal injury. The greatest of these are, The Co-
lumbia Study,62 made in the early Thirties, of the economic consequences of
personal injuries suffered in automobile accidents, and a study made by the
Railroad Retirement Board63 of the consequences of work injuries in the rail-
road industry for the years 1938-1940. There have also been some minor later
studies to test whether the conditions shown by the Columbia Study continued
to exist in the post-war period.6 4 There has also been a significant study into
the comparative costs of administering workmen's compensation statutes and
the modified common law system which covers railroad workers -under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act.65 Finally there have been several studies by
industrial psychologists and others into the kinds of human behavior which
cause accidents. 66
From these studies facts of outstanding significance emerge. I shall take
up first those which concern the consequences of injury under the present sys-
tem, for the injured party.
1. There is an overall inadequacy of payments as measured by the eco-
nomic loss actually suffered. This inadequacy is striking where defendants are
62. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH IN TnE SOCIAL SCIENCES, REPORT
BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932) (hereafter
called the COLUMBIA STuDY).
63. U.S. RAILROAD RELTRMENT BOARD, WORK INJURIES IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY
1938-40 (1947) (hereafter called the RAILROAD STUDY). See Pollak, Workmen's Compen-
sation for Railroad Work Injuries, 36 CoiN. L.Q. 236 (1951), for a summary of many of
the findings in this study.
64. James and Law, Compensation for Auto Accident Victims: A Story of Too Little
and Too Late, 26 CoNN. B.J. 70 (1952); Economic-Financial Consequences of Personal
Injuries Sustained in 1953 Philadelphia Auto Accidents, 7 EcoNomucs & Bus. BULL. No. 3
(March 1955) (by the Temple University Bureau of Economic and Business Research;
hereafter called the TEMPLE STUDY).
Both these studies are briefly described in Marx, "Motorism," Not "Pedestrianism":
Compensation for Automobile Victims, 42 A.B..J. 421 (1956).
See also Grad, Recent Developments in Automobile Accident Compensation, 50 COL.
L. REV. 300 (1950).
65. Conard and Mehr, COSTS OF ADMINISTERING REPARATION FOR WORK INJURIES IN
ILLIxoIs (1952); Conard, Workmen's Compensation: Is It More Efficient than Employer's
Liability? 38 A.B.A.J. 1011 (1952).
This study found that the administration of the federal act "costs less per dollar of
benefit conferred" than workmen's compensation.
66. Many of these studies are collected in James and Dickinson, Accident Proneness
and Accident Law, 63 HARv. L. REv. 769 (1950); 2 HARPER & JAMES, LAW or TORTS §11.4
(1956).
See also SCHUIZINGER, THE ACCIDENT SYNDROME, THE GENESIS or ACCIDENTAL INJURY(1956) (casting doubt on the hypothesis of accident proneness, but offering no more com-
fort to those who seek moral fault as basis for accident responsibility. "[I)n the final
analysis, accidents are a medical problem and further major improvements in accident
prevention must be in terms of clinical medicine with special emphasis on the adjustment
of the individual to himself and to his environment." p. 218).
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uninsured individuals. 7 Even where there is insurance or financial respon-
sibility, however, average payments fall far short of the actual economic loss,
especially in the case of serious injuries and death. Thus the Columbia Study
concluded: "In the small loss groups the losses in the insured cases are more
than covered by the payment received, while in the large loss groups the losses
are not covered." 8 Where losses exceeded $2500, payments covered only a
third to a half of these losses. And this conclusion is based on wage loss and
medical expenses up to the time of investigation only, while the serious cases
involved continuing future losses which were not counted.69 If they had been,
the inadequacy in such cases would have been even more pronounced. The
Railroad Study showed that the average net recovery for railroad work injuries
was less than half of the wage loss even after the estimated future losses had
been reduced to present worth.70
Later studies indicate that this overall inadequacy still persists in spite of
occasional spectacularly high verdicts and settlements. 71
2. There is a tremendous inequality of payments made to those with
similar economic losses. Thus the Railroad Study showed that payments in
permanent total disability cases ranged all the way from zero to $50,000.72
Today, of course, the top figure would be substantially higher 73 and the range
consequently even wider.
3. The payment of a lump sum of money to an injured man gives very
inadequate assurance that his future losses will be properly taken care of.74
Accident victims as a class are not well equipped to conserve and invest with
skill large capital sums.
4. Accident victims as a class come from the lower income groups and
contain a very high proportion of wage earners.75 These facts hold true not only
for industrial accidents but also for motor accidents. They mean that the loss
inflicted by personal injury creates great hardships not only for the victim, but
also for his family, his doctor, his landlord, his grocer, and other creditors-
often ultimately for society.76
5. Many of these losses may be guarded against-theoretically-by in-
surance of one kind or another which the injured man himself has taken out.
Accident insurance, blue cross, and medical insurance are available for this pur-
67. COLu-mmBIA STUDY 203-205, Appendices Nos. 5-10, 12-16; James and Law, op. cit.
supra note 64 at 74-76.
68. COLuSBIA STUDY 266.
69. Ibid. See also Corstvet, The Uncompensated Accident and its Consequences, 3
LAW & CoNTr . PR. 466 (1936).
70. RAROAD STUDY 6. The total estimated wage loss was $30,500,000. This was
adjusted to $24,000,000 when reduced to present worth. The total amount paid to claim-
ants was about $12,000,000. The cost of acquiring this amount was about $1,000,000.
71. Sources cited note 64, supra.
72. PoIlak, op. cit. supra note 63 at 247-248; RAnRoAD STUmr 13, 101, 107, 115, 119,
129, 133; COLUMBIA STUDY, Appendices Nos. 10, 11.
73. See 22 NACCA L.J. 388 et seq. (1958).
74. Pollak, op. cit. supra note 63 at 250; RAILRoAD STUDY 15, 16, 166-176.
75. Corstvet, op. cit. supra note 69; CoLUMIA STUDY 55, 66, 219; Ts PLE STUDY 27.
76. Corstvet, op. cit. supra note 75.
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pose. But the studies show that very few accident victims are in fact protected
in any material degree against such losses.77 Moreover the poorer the victim is
the less likely he is to be insured. To put it another way: the greater the need
the less likely it is to be met by this type of insurance. All this is still true today,
despite the growth of social insurance, blue cross plans, and fringe benefits in
labor contractsj 8 Under the present system, then, accident victims depend
heavily on tort recoveries or settlements to meet their economic losses.
6. Much of the loss resulting from accidental injury is economic loss
which can be provided for by money recovery.
If we turn from a consideration of the injured party to look at the other
side of the coin-the defendant's side, we find from the studies facts which are
equally significant.
1. Only insurance companies and large corporate self-insurers pay any-
thing to speak of in the way of tort damages or settlements. Uninsured mo-
torists, although they cause more than their share of accidents,10 seldom in fact
pay anything significant. Employee-participants in an accident-people like the
bus driver or the train crew-are practically never called on to pay anything.
Those individuals in management who make the decisions for a business which
turn out to cause injury and to be found negligent, seldom pay the damages for
that injury. In short the individuals whose personal fault constitutes the legal
basis of liability do not pay for the accidents they negligently cause.
2. There is great disparity between the bargaining position of insurers and
large self-insurers on the one hand, and that of injured persons, on the other,
who come by and large from the lower income brackets. To make matters
worse, the greater the injury, the loss, and the need, the weaker the victim's
bargaining position becomes and the less able he is to wait for the outcome of
the tedious process of litigation.
3. Studies of the kinds of human behavior which produce accidents show
that the conscious free choice of the participants plays far less of a role than is
commonly supposed. A disproportionate number of accidents is caused by a
relatively small group of accident prone persons.80 Accident proneness may
stem from defects in vision, from the relationship between speed of perception
and reaction time; from personality traits (sometimes of a compulsive nature);
from cycles of depression found even in normal persons; or from youth or in-
experience. These findings greatly reduce, though they do not eliminate, the
importance of ethical fault in accident producing behavior. They also indicate
the futility of putting the pressure of tort liability directly on individual par-
ticipants in order to promote safety. Individuals are often blissfully ignorant
of their own accident proneness or of the factors which make them so. Nor are
they aware of the tests and the training methods which might help the situation.
77. Sources cited note 75, supra.
78. James and Law op. cit. supra note 64, at 74; TnMuLE STuDy 30, 86, 90.
79. TFman'xa STomy 32, 33.
80. Sources cited note 66, supra.
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It is from large units like employer groups and insurance companies that these
studies have come, and it is large units which have made successful use of these
findings to reduce accidents.
4. Experience has now shown that the presence of insurance against lia-
bility for accidents does not lead to any increase in accidents caused by insured
persons. 8' This shows again, in a negative way, that the threat of personal civil
liability is a negligible factor in accident prevention.
5. The stricter liability imposed by Workmen's Compensation on em-
ployers not only led in part to the studies of accident proneness but it was also
followed by a substantial reduction of the industrial accident rate8 2 during a
period marked by a tremendous growth of productive efficiency.
These are the studies. Let us next see what light they shed on the way we
are now trying to solve the accident problem through the medium of tort law.
So far as the accident victim's compensation goes, the present system is a
miserable failure, marked by stark overall inadequacy punctuated by occasional
fantastically high awards. The condition is one of feast and famine. And even
the high awards do not in many cases meet future needs because they are
squandered or unwisely invested. The only class that profits systematically
from the present system is the lawyers-and I do not say this to disparage, for
I think many of them are doing a conscientious job, given present circum-
stances, but I do say it to note an important fact in the situation.
If our present system fails to give adequate and equitably distributed com-
pensation to accident victims, does it nevertheless operate efficiently to control
the behavior that might produce accidents?
Our first conclusion here must be that we do not now have liability based
on fault in a sense which is significant in terms of individual morality. For one
thing, the conduct of an accident prone person will often amount to negligence
in law when it involves no ethical shortcoming. But beyond that, liability today
is seldom visited, in accident cases, on the individual who is to blame even
where there is genuine blameworthiness. Those who pay in fact are innocent
absentees.
Our next conclusion will be that the pressure of civil liability yields little
if anything in terms of accident prevention if exerted directly against indi-
viduals. It will yield more if exerted in the first instance against employers and,
probably, insurance companies.
It is also clear that strict liability for accidental injury will not reduce (and
will probably increase) the pressure towards accident prevention.
Finally it will be concluded that strict liability, at least if coupled with
reasonable limitation on amounts, will not discourage desirable activity and
enterprise.
Another conclusion of a more general nature emerges. Under our present
81. 2 HARPER & jAm.,s, LAW or TORTS §13.5 (1956).
82. Ibid.
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system techniques have been developed for the broad distribution of losses, and
the imposition of liability in fact tends to bring about such distribution.
The upshot of all this to me seems clear. Motor accidents should be
handled on a broad compensation basis under which liability is dependent on
the fact and extent of injury and not on fault. But compensation should be
limited in amount. All injured persons should receive a minimum portion of
their actual economic losses to be paid periodically as such losses occur. In-
surance-whether in the form of liability or loss insurance-should be com-
pulsory and its cost borne by the owners of vehicles-the direct beneficiaries
of motoring.
I believe, and I think we may safely assume at this point, that any such
program as this calls for legislation and cannot be brought about in anything
like the requisite completeness by the courts. This naturally brings us to the
question of what the courts should do in the meantime. But before we get to
this let us interrupt the continuity of our argument to take a quick look at
another field wherein some of the factors are similar at least superficially yet
where, I believe, quite a different pattern of legal solution is appropriate, though
there is need for further study before coming to a firm conclusion on the matter.
I refer to defamatory statements made by our media of mass communications-
newspaper, radio and television. Here, as in much of the accident field, we have
enterprises carrying on business for profit and individuals injured as a by-
product of the activities of that business. Here, too, we have available liability
insurance to aid in distributing the loss. Here, too, there is often the same lack
of real fault as is so often found in accidental injury. The analogy has been
tempting to some. And indeed the traditional basis of liability here is strict-a
species of what we have called unlawfulness.
Here, however, there are questions calling for study which may well point
to different solutions. In the first place the injury done often entails no pecuni-
ary loss so that compensation may not be made so aptly by money award. Per-
haps other forms of relief, which would be only a mockery in case of personal
injury, may come closer to satisfying the legitimate grievance of one defamed. 8
We should find if we can some way to measure the gravity of this intangible
injury and the effectiveness of the possible means of redressing it.84
On defendant's side the deterrent effect of a money judgment may be
fraught with untoward consequences. Certainly where the defamation occurs in
the course of news or comment on matters of real public concern-and I mean
83. See, e.g., Chafee, New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 HAzv. L. REV. 1
(1946); Donnelly, The Right of Reply: An Alternative to an Action for Libel, 34 VA. L.
REV. 867 (1948); Morris, Inadvertent Libel and Retraction, 32 ILL. L. REV. 36 (1937).
Cf. Werner v. Southern California Assoc. Newspapers, 35 Cal.2d 121, 216 P.2d 825
(1950), noted 38 CArar. L. REV. 951 (1950); 64 HARv. L. REV. 678 (1951); 99 U.P.L. REV.
107 (1950).
84. Sociologists have already made some studies which suggest that techniques could
be devised to make the kinds of studies needed to yield such data. See, e.g., KLAPPR,
THE EFEcms OF MASS MEDIA (Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University)
(1950); HOVLAND, JANs AND KELLEY, COMUNICAToMN AND PERSUASION (1953); KATZ &
LAZARSFELD, PERSONAL INFLUENCE (1955).
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concern beyond the interest we all have in news of private misfortune or scandal
-it is of the greatest public importance to have brought home to the public
the manifold points of view and comments of men with variant ideas. It is one
of the first articles in our belief in democracy that ideas be free to compete for
our acceptance. The media themselves are no longer so likely to do this as they
were in the early days of the republic. Existing studies show us that newspaper
publishing is big business s5 Some broadcasting stations are small but they de-
pend materially on the large networks. These businesses by and large are engaged
in to make money rather than to disseminate points of view-especially un-
popular points of view. One of our big problems is to keep these channels free
as vehicles for other points of view than their own-voices that will not be
heard if the media of communication are closed to them. If the businesses that
run these media are to be strictly liable for statements by persons who use their
facilities for comment on public issues, whenever these statements turn out to
be defamatory, then certainly there is danger that these businesses will be re-
luctant to let their facilities be used for this purpose in which the public has so
great an interest.8 6 We should find out if we can just how great this danger is.
Already the law has recognized this interest by creating a privilege to
comment about facts of public interest. But the privilege does not (in New York
for instance) cover honest mistakes about those facts.8 7 And there is conflict
among decisions upon the question whether a broadcaster is liable without fault
for spontaneous, ad-libbed statements made by non-employees over its facil-
ities.88
I cite these matters as areas for further study and as illustrating areas
where studies may well indicate a retreat from strict liability for money damages.
THE ROLE OF THE CoURTs IN THE MEANTIME
Let us return now to the motor accident field. It is clear, as we have seen,
that the program proposed would require legislation. It is also perfectly clear
that we may have to wait a long time for it.
When I was practicing tort law for the New Haven Railroad back in the
days of Hoover's presidency, there were hard headed practitioners who thought
a compensation scheme for auto accidents was, like prosperity, just around the
85. Commnssiox ON FREEDOM OF T PRss, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 37, 50
(1947); IcKEs, AmERIcA's HousE OF LORDS 10-13 (1939).
86. See Murphy, J., in Dale System v. General Teleradio, 105 F.Supp. 745, 751-752(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
87. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947); Noel, Defamation of
Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COL. L. REv. 875 (1949). Contra: Charles Parker Co. v.
Silver City Crystal Co., 142 Conn. 605, 116 A.2d 440 (1955). See Hall, Preserving the
Liberty of the Press by the Defence of Privilege in Libel Actions, 26 CAL. L. Rxv. 226
(1938).
88. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1952); Miles v. Louis Wasmer,
Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P.2d 847 (1933) impose strict liability. On the other hand negli-
gence was required for liability in Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143 (1948);
Josephson v. Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., 179 Misc. 787, 38 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Co. 1942); Summit Hotel Co. v. National B. Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d 302 (1959).
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corner. In the next few years the New Deal sired, out of the Depression, social
insurance schemes that went far beyond anything most of us had even dreamed
of. But not this one.
Why? It may be that the public does not yet want social insurance here;
but if that is so, the general will is schizophrenic. Surely there is a strong pop-
ular urge towards strict liability here, wherever it can be seen that defendant
can absorb and distribute the loss--wherever, that is, there is insurance in the
case. There may be pulls in the opposite direction. We still often think of
liability as theoretically an individual matter-a sort of penalty that should
not be visited on the innocent. And especially in these days of astronomical
verdicts we are still lured on by the hope of hitting a jack pot.
But I suspect that the main reason why we haven't compensation here is
the fact that there are strong pressure groups against it and this includes the
ranks of our own profession who--we must face it-are the chief beneficiaries
of our horse and buggy system, and the insurance companies who regard com-
pensation here as too socialistic, just as their predecessors regarded workman's
compensation. On the other hand there is no pressure group to take up the
cudgels for accident compensation although a growing number of disinterested
students of the problem are coming to regard it as the only sensible long run
solution.
If we are right about the solution and if it is to be postponed as long as I
fear, the question arises what the courts should do in the meantime.
There are several possibilities.
One thing courts might do is to stand still, declaring that all further change
is for the legislature to make.
A second thing courts might do is to unmake changes that have already
been made.
Still a third possibility is to make further changes in the direction of more
complete compensation and distribution of the loss.
There are no doubt other possibilities but these are the principal con-
tenders on the modern scene.
I suggest with diffidence that courts should follow the third of these courses
of action, and I believe they are already doing so and are very likely to con-
tinue to do so.
The specific changes which I should like to see the courts bring about
through the process of common law change are these (and it should be noted
that some courts have already made many of them):
First, in meeting a problem of accident litigation, courts should, I submit,
consciously and expressly deal with the factual and policy questions really
involved in the problem, and these would include the effect of the decision in
terms of compensation and loss distribution. The results of sociological studies
suggested before, would greatly help the courts to do this. Courts do write
opinions like this on occasion, but too often they talk in fictional terms which
only conceal the real problems. Consider the way many courts have treated a
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minor child's suit against his parent for injuries caused by negligent automobile
driving. Recovery is generally denied because suit would threaten parental
discipline and the family peace, and give the injured child too big a share of
the family pocketbook.8 9 'Such talk is nonsense. The only time a suit like this
is brought is when there is insurance. The real dangers are too much-not too
little-family harmony, and a threat to the pocketbooks of the insurance com-
pany and its other policyholders-not to the family pocketbook. A commendable
example of careful and realistic analysis in a situation of this kind is to be
found in a New Hampshire decision.90 There are a good many examples in
other situations.91
Second, I should like to see the courts extend the law of negligence so as to
eliminate pockets of immunity under existing law. I am happy to say that the
New York court has been a pioneer along this line. Some of these pockets of
immunity from liability for negligence are:
(1) Intra-family suits92 (like those between parent and minor child).
(2) Pre-natal injuries. Not long ago most states denied recovery for injury
negligently caused to a child before birth.9 3 In the last ten years
several states, including New York,94 have repudiated this immunity.
(3) Not long ago a majority of American courts denied recovery for injury
caused through emotional distress without impact.9 5 A defendant
would be liable for negligently scratching a man's hand, but not for
negligently scaring him to death. Many courts have now repudiated
this limitation. 8 New York decisions are equivocal. 97
(4) A century ago the maker of an article for sale owed no duty to make
it safe for anyone beyond the immediate purchaser even though the
purchaser might be a dealer and the only persons likely to be hurt by
the defect might be remote purchasers and users.98 New York courts
were among the first to break with this limitation99 which is now widely
89. See, e.g., Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Lasecki v. Kabara,
235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940).
90. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ati. 905 (1930).
91. See, e.g., President & Directors of Georgetown Hospital v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C.Cir. 1942); Escola v. Coca Cola B. Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944)
(concurring opinion of Traynor, J.); Jacobsen v. Dailey, 228 Minn. 201, 36 N.W.2d 711(1949); Kohlman v. Hyland, 54 N.D. 710, 210 N.W. 643 (1926); Jacob E. Decker & Sons
v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942).
92. McCurdy, Torts Between People in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. Rav. 1030
(1930).
93. Note, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 166 (1951).
94. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
95. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) was a typical
decision.
96. See Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 VA. L. REv. 198 (1944);
Symposium on the Urban Case, 27 CoNN. B.J. (1953).
97. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Liability in New York, 24 ST. JoIN's L. REv.
1 (1949).
98. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Bohlen,
Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other than their Immediate Vendees, 45 L.Q. REv.
343 (1929).
99. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), is the
culmination of a long line of cases.
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repudiated. 10° Its ghost lingers on, however, in a rule which denies
recovery against a contractor for injuries caused by his negligence to
third persons after his work has been accepted by the party with whom
the contract was made.x0 ' A recent opinion of the Court of Appeals
has said this is no longer New York law.
0 2
(5) Until the second World War most American states denied the liability
of charitable institutions for the negligence of their employees.1 3 Two
years ago New York swept away the last vestiges of this immunity. 0 4
(6) The occupier of land still enjoys a wide immunity from liability for
negligence towards those who enter upon his land. He owes little or
no duty of care to trespassers no matter how likely they are to tres-
pass.0 5 He owes only a very limited duty of care to those who come
on his land for their own purposes but with his permission.' 00 Even to
his business visitors or invitees, the occupier owes only the duty to dis-
close dangerous defects and need not repair them. 0 7 Courts in many
states have made substantial inroads on these immunities but here
New York courts have been more reluctant than most.'08 It would be
my proposal that courts withdraw these immunities altogether and
substitute the tests of negligence generally applied in accident cases.
Third. I should like to see courts continue to make changes within the
field of negligence itself along lines already well charted by rules which relax
the burden of proof (like res ipsa loquitur) in situations where this burden is
overlikely to defeat meritorious claims; and by rules which would enlarge the
jury's role on the issues of liability. Examples of this would be progressive
abandonment of fixed standards of conduct 0 9 and the progressive extension of
last clear chance" 0 and other notions which would cut down the defense of con-
tributory negligence.
100. Carter v. Yardley & Co., 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946); RESTATiENT,
TORTS §§395-398 (1934).
101. Benton Harbor Malleable Industries, Inc. v. Pearson Constr. Co., 348 Mich. 471,
83 N.W.2d 429 (1957).
102. See Inman v. Binghamton Housing Authority, 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143-144, 143 N.E.2d
895, 898-899 (1957).
103. See opinion of Rutledge, J., in President & Directors of Georgetown Hospital v.
Hughes, note 91 supra, exhaustively considering development of the rule; Annotation, 25
A.L.R.2d 29 (1952).
104. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957).
105. Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Co., 296 N.Y. 154, 71 N.E.2d 447 (1947).
106. Laube v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 78 A.2d 693 (1951); Wilder v. Ayres, 3
N.Y.2d 725, 143 N.E.2d 514 (1957).
107. RESTATEmENT, TORTS §343(c) (iii) (1934).
108. Carbone v. Mackchil Realty Co., supra note 105. But see Mayer v. Temple
Properties, 307 N.Y. 867, 122 N.E2d 750 (1954); Runkel v. Homelsky, 286 App. Div.
1101, 145 N.Y.S.2d 729 (2d Dept. 1955), aff'd, 3 N.Y.2d 857, 145 N.E.2d 23 (1957).
109. See McKinney v. Yelavich, 352 Mich. 687, 90 N.W.2d 883 (1958); Nixon, op.
cit. supra note 41; 2 HARPER & JAmES, LAW OF TORTS §§17.1, 17.2 (1956).
110. New York has been more reluctant than most states to extend the last clear
chance doctrine. Contrast Woloszynowski v. New York Central R.R., 254 N.Y. 206, 172
N.E. 471 (1930) with RESTA= NT, TORTS §§479, 480 (1934). But see Kumkumian v.
City of New York, 305 N.Y. 167, 111 N.E.2d 865 (1953).
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Fourth. I should like to see courts maintain and extend existing areas of
strict liability. The principal ones which courts have worked out are these:
Liability on a warranty of fitness, or of merchantability, of an article sold
by defendant to plaintiff.11' The New York courts, aided by the codifying Sales
Act, pioneered in the fashioning of this liability.112 More recently other courts
have extended it by abandoning at least partly the limitation of privity and
allowing recovery by an injured consumer directly against the maker even
though the purchase was not direct.113
Ultrahazardous activities, like blasting or the shooting of oil wells, are often
regarded as involving strict liability." 4 It is my belief that this is a sound notion
and that courts should be increasingly liberal in characterizing dangerous activ-
ities as "ultrahazardous.""15
The New York courts have historically given wide scope to the ancient
action of trespass. This has led lower courts to hold airplane operations strictly
liable for ground damage they cause.'-" The Court of Appeals has not yet
spoken. It is to be hoped that Court will not disturb the rule-its reasoning
may reflect antiquity, but its substance has the shape of the future.
Finally, I should like to see the courts make certain changes in the field of
damages. The present law is based on the notions of full compensation for all
items of loss including many non-pecuniary items. This may well be justified
where damages are paid by a wrongdoer to his innocent victim. But the re-
quirements of fault and innocence are progressively, and I think properly, being
diluted in response to a growing feeling that compensation for a cripple or a
dead man's dependents should not turn on whether somebody forgot to look,
or inadvertently gave the wrong signal, on this occasion. And once we recognize
that human failings like these are an inevitable part of our system and that
human injuries are simply a part of its cost, then the moral claim to such full
compensation loses some of its force. This has been pointed out by one of the
former deans of this School.117
The foregoing, I believe, should be reflected by the courts in two ways:
First they should continue to supervise overall amounts of verdicts.
111. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 Mnqw. L. Rav. 117
(1943); PRossER, HANDBOOK or THE LAW or TORTS 506 et seq. (2d ed. 1955); HARPER &
JAmEs, LAW or TORTS §§28.15 et seq. (1956).
112. Ryan v. Progressive Grocery Stores, 255 N.Y. 388, 175 N.E. 105 (1931).
113. See, e.g., Mannsz v. MacWhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445 (30 Cir. 1946); McAfee v.
Cargill, 121 F.Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954), noted 8 V~AD. L. REV. 149 (1954); Davis v. Van
Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920); Jacob E. Decker & Sons v. Capps,
139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942); Symposium, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24
TmN. L. Rxv. 923-1018 (1957).
114. RESTATEUMNT, ToRTs §519 (1934).
115. Recent decisions which I should call "liberal" include Chapman Chemical Co.
v. Taylor, 215 Ark. 630, 222 S.W.2d 820 (1949); Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal.2d 489, 190
P.2d 1 (1948).
116. Rochester Gas & Elec. Co. v. Dunlap, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N.Y. Supp. 469 (Monroe
Co. Ct., 1933); Halm v. U.S. Airlines, 127 F.Supp. 951 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Margosian v.
U.S. Airlines, 127 F.Supp. 464 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
117. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAw & CON-
TP. PR. 219 (1953).
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Secondly they should reverse much of the judge-made "collateral source"
rule. This is a rule that lets plaintiff recover in a tort suit for items of loss
which have already been met by someone other than the defendant. Thus if a
plaintiff has already had his wages paid"18 (for the time he lost because of his
injury) or his medical and hospital bills completely taken care of-perhaps at
public expense 1l 9-he may still recover in full for those items from the tort
defendant under the prevailing American rule. And many courts allow him to
recover damages-which are not subject to income tax-computed on the loss
of income before taxes.120 Such rulings in effect provide double recovery. In
most situations they cannot be reconciled even with the notion of full compensa-
tion. They should have no place at all in a system under which damages are
more and more often being paid by persons who are not at fault.
So much for a statement of what I should like to see courts do in the near
future, pending the comprehensive legislative change which I believe is the
better long range solution.
This interim program has been attacked and certainly will be attacked
again. As I see it the attackers fall into two main groups. There are those who
raise substantive objections, who basically disagree with the whole philosophy
underlying both the long range solution and proposals for the interim, who want
no part of any scheme of social insurance and prefer the individualism which
they believe underlies the present law of negligence.' 2 ' There are also those who
would accept a comprehensive scheme for compensation without fault but who
shrink from my proposals from what the courts should do in the meantime.122
118. Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927); McCoR a[cx, HANDBOOX
o N THE LAW OF DAmAGES 310 (1935).
This is not the rule in New York. Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).
119. Denver & G.R. Co. v. Lorentzen, 79 Fed. 291 (8th Cir. 1897); Hudson v. Lazarus,
217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Plank v. Summers, 203 Md. 552, 102 A.2d 262 (1954).
See notes 42 GEo. L.J. 556 (1954), 43 id. 515 (1955) ; 68 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1954) ; James,
Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L.
R V. 537 (1952).
120. Stokes v. United States, 144 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1944); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v.
Civil, 178 F.2d 497 (8th Cir. 1949); Hall v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 5 Ill. 2d 135,
125 N.E.2d 77 (1955). But see Floyd v. Fruit Industries, 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918
(1957).
See Harnett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 614 (1952); Nordstrom, Income Taxes
and Personal Injury Awards, 19 Onso ST. L. Rav. 212 (1958); 2 HARPER & JA.Ms, LAw
oF TORTS §25.12 (1956).
121. See, e.g., HorTamss, THE Co orN LAw 96 (1881); Sherman, Grounds for Oppos-
ing the Automobile Compensation Plan, 3 LAw & CONTEMP. PR. 598 (1936); McVay, Reply
to "The Case for Compulsory Automobile Compensation," 15 On. ST. L. Rav. 162 (1954);
Ryan and Greene, "Pedestrianism": A Strange Philosophy, 42 A.B.A.J. 117 (1956); cf.
Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products-An
Opposing View, 24 TFNN. L. Rav. 938 (1957).
There are also those who would accept most of my proposals for the near future but
reject my long-run proposal. See, e.g., Richter and Forer, The Railroad Industry and
Work-Incurred Disabilities, 36 CoaR. L.Q. 203 (1951); de Parcq, The Supreme Court and
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 1956-57 Term, 36 Tmx. L. Rlv. 145 (1957). This in
general is the position of the National Association of Claimants' Compensation Attorneys
(NACCA). See Lambert, Editorial, 17 NACCA L.J. 23 (1956); 19 id. 25 (1957).
122. See Cooperrider, A Comment on The Law of Torts, 56 Mcn. L. REv. 1291
(1958). Professor Cooperrider apparently accepts with reluctance the need for a compen-
sation scheme for motor accidents. At least he is " . . . not inclined to argue . . . " that
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Theoretically, these two classes are mutually exclusive. Actually I suspect
they are not, and that the reason for this lies in the fundamental weakness of
the first position. In fact, we could not if we would in this day and age recap-
ture the conditions that made early accident litigation a matter between neigh-
bor and neighbor-for one sufficient reason among many because we cannot
abolish liability insurance. The notions of individualism that underlay the de-
velopment of negligence law during the last century do not in fact underlie
accident law today, and no philosophy and no amount of wishing will make it so.
Most people realize this more or less consciously and therefore few will be found
to embrace the all out position that we should try to restore what has gone out
of our system. But many people are unhappy about this and their nostalgia,
which cannot be satisfied, leads them to espouse the status quo as though it
still contained the substance of which it is only the shadow; or to grant the
logic of compensation, with melancholy reluctance, but at the same time to
resist any specific step that takes us nearer that goal as an inadequate half-way
measure.
There is however much more substance than this to many objections levelled
against the interim position. Let us examine them. One set of objections is
addressed to the system which the proposed judicial changes would produce.
This, it is charged, would be "incomplete, both internally and externally."' 2 It
would leave many accident losses uncompensated as well as many other losses
"of equal significance to society." 124 It would be uneven in its incidence both
among plaintiffs and among defendants. Moreover, "the 'loss distribution' aspect
of the system is a naked assumption' 25 of doubtful validity. There is also
another aspect to the argument from incompleteness. Half-way measures are
said to relieve the pressure for more complete reform. 120
Another set of objections takes a different tack. Even if the changes I
would urge upon the courts--or some of them-are good ones, they should not
be made by the courts without legislation. It would do violence to the integrity
of the common law system for the courts to make these changes. Moreover to
the extent that they call for an extension of the jury's sphere it is said that they
involve a "shocking abdication of judicial responsibility.' 2 7 All the foregoing
would call into "grave question the continuing validity of the common law
system itself.'- 28
To the incompleteness and inequities of the interim system I must plead
confession and avoidance. I do not claim and I do not believe that a satisfactory
such accidents" . . . should not be . . . " treated in accordance with that theory. Id. at
1302.
123. Id. at 1306.
124. Ibid.
125. Id. at 1306.
126. See Frankfurter, J. (concurring in part), in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163,
197 (1949); cf. Peairs, The God in the Machine, 29 B.U.L. Rav. 37, 77 (1949); James,
Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases, 37 VA. L. Rav. 179, 187 note 27 (1951); note 130
infra.
127. Cooperrider, op. cit. supra note 122 at 1311.
128. Id. at 1312.
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system for handling accident losses can be worked out through the judicial
process. Any system we have, short of a comprehensive legislative compensation
scheme, will be full of hardship, unevenness, compromise and inconsistency.
These are the hallmarks of the present system. All I should expect from interim
judicial changes is relief from a few of the worst injustices (as I view them) of
the present dispensation. It is against these the comparison must be drawn, not
against the provisions of any more ideal legislative program.
The loss distribution aspect of any contemplated change should not, I
agree, be nakedly assumed. Factual studies should be directed to this matter
and the courts should always find out all they can about it and draw reasonable
conclusions from their experience and common knowledge, when nothing more
specific is at hand. Not every possible judicial extension of liability would lead
to better loss distribution.12 9 Enough is already known, however, to suggest
pretty clearly when decisions on many questions will have that effect and when
they will not. The studies we reviewed earlier in these talks are replete with
lessons on the subject, for those who really wish to learn.
There is one more phase of the argument from incompleteness. There are
those who fear small reforms as "the worst enemies of great reforms."' 0° The
logical conclusion of this argument is that judges who believe in a compensa-
tion scheme should make their decisions under the present system so impalatable
that an aroused public will clamor for change. There are I think at least two
answers to this. For one thing it rests on a very doubtful assumption about the
practical operations of political science. Great changes are often ushered in by
a gradual erosion of the old order; "by resort to juries, to fictions, to com-
promises with logic,"' 31 that presage the new order. But more than that, this
reasoning would call on judges to render decisions which they believe to be
unjust ones in the cases before them, in the hope that this would make the legis-
lature do what the court thought best for society. This would cast the courts in
a role somewhere between that of God and Machiavelli in our body politic.132
I think we need not stop to ask whether this would be desirable, for surely it
would be a psychological impossibility for most judges deliberately to render
wrong decisions so as to make the system they administer an abomination.
The remaining objections duster around the notion that the interim pro-
posals for judge-made change would do "violence-to the integrity of the com-
mon law system."'1 33 The objectors recognize, of course, the common law's
129. Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172
(1958); 2 HARPER & J. Es, LAW Or TORTS 1053, 1276, 1343-1360, 1403-4 (1956). Cf.
James, Contribution Among Joint Tort Feasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HAmv. L. Rzv.
1156 (1941).
130. MoLmEY, ON COINROLSE 185 (rev. ed. 1877), quoted in Wyzanski, A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. Rlv. 1281, 1286 (1952).
131. Wyzanski, op. cit. supra note 130 at 1286, 1287.
132. I am indebted to mimeographed teaching materials prepared by Professor Mish-
kin of the University of Pennsylvania Law School, for suggestions that led to some of
the thoughts expressed here.
133. Cooperrider, op. cit. supra note 122 at 1306.
TORT LAW IN MIDSTREAM
capacity for growth. But in the past this is thought to have been interstitial
and to have been checked by a more wholesome regard for stare decisis than is
abroad in the land today. The changes proposed here on the other hand "in-
volve judicial assumption of legislative power considerably more grandiose than
those"'134 in the past.
I doubt whether such an objection is compatible with historical perspective.
Some of the greatest edifices in our law were originally wrought by courts with-
out the aid of-sometimes in the very teeth of-legislation. The most casual
look will show how true this has been throughout the course of Anglo-American
legal history.
The law of trusts was a creature of the early courts of equity' 35 and has
been a judicial device to this very day for attaining justice where it would be
thwarted by more inflexible rules of judge-made or statutory law.
The rule against perpetuities was a child of the judicial process.13 6
The modern law of contract and the doctrine of consideration were wrought
by the common law courts.
137
The statute of frauds has been greatly tempered and modified by judicial
doctrines like part performance.'
3 8
Courts, not legislatures, invented the concepts of restitution and quasi-
contract.
1 3
Coming closer in time and subject matter to our present concern, we see
tremendous changes in the law of torts brought about by nineteenth century
courts. The whole law of negligence as a principle to govern accidents is
scarcely older than that,140 and it supplanted an earlier, stricter liability in
trespass, which in turn was itself fashioned by the judicial process.
The defense of contributory negligence was a later development than neg-
ligence; this year marks its one hundred fiftieth anniversary. 141
Indeed many of the very doctrines which I should like to see today's courts
overrule were invented by other courts within the last century. The parent's
immunity from suit by his minor child was first announced by a Mississippi
court in 1891.142 Recovery for prenatal injury was first denied in 1884, by a
Massachusetts court.' 43 The American version of immunity for charitable insti-
tutions stems from decisions in Massachusetts14 4 and Maryland' 45 in the 70s
134. Id. at 1307. Quite a different view from Professor Cooperrider's may be found
in SEAVEY, COGITATIONS ON TORTS (1954).
135. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 566-569 (4th ed. 1948).
136. Id. at 563-568.
137. Id. at 592-618; Ames, History of Assumnpsit, 2 HARv. L. REV. 1, 53 (1888).
138. 2 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS ch. 18 (1950).
139. Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burrows 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760); DusRaa AND
PALMER, CASES ON RESTITUTIONS 1-5 (1958).
140. See note 3 supra.
141. Batterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809).
142. Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
143. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
144. McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
145. Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885).
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and 80s and these decisions were based on English cases which were but a few
decades older and had already been overruled in England ten years before they
were resurrected on this side of the Atlantic. 146 The discrimination against in-
juries resulting from emotional disturbance caused by negligence, 147 and the
limitation on the maker's liability for a defective product' 48 emerged during the
nineteenth century as the tort of negligence was itself coming to flower.
Those who feel that my proposals would take the courts beyond their tra-
ditional role stress the vitality which stare decisis used to have, and its former
hold on the courts. 149 This it is thought curbed judicial legislation and kept it
in its proper place. Courts changed the law only in a circumscribed and inter-
stitial way. But when one looks back over the long course of the common law
one wonders whether these objectors may not be misled by the way courts talked
into overlooking what they did. The principle of stare decisis has always had
and still has vitality in our common law development. Yet it has not from the
very beginning prevented very great changes, made without benefit of statute.
Some of these changes were more radical and thorough-going than any pro-
posals made here. This suggests that what some people think of as greater
respect for stare decisis in the olden days may have been nothing more than
greater lip service so that judges formerly took greater pains to conceal their
changes by fiction or to use language which would give them the appearance of
being merely interstitial. But time and again as the older structure of the law
crumbled these interstitial secretions emerged to constitute a new and altogether
different structure. I suggest that the newer judicial attitude toward stare
decisis is not a disparagement of its real worth but rather a more realistic
attempt to chart the line where stability ends and the common law's dynamic
side-its capacity for growth and adaptation, also of ancient lineage-begins.
A part of the objection that these proposals do violence to the fabric of
our common law system is the charge that they call on the courts "to abdicate
completely to the jury the function of applying ... policy to the case at hand."' 00
The word abdicate of course is an emotive word suggesting something improper.
But let us leave polemics and look at the thing objectively.
Throughout the history of the jury system it has been recognized that the
jury does not always stick to its theoretical function and apply the law in the
judge's charge to the facts as they find them. Juries sometimes take the law
into their own hands and decide a case according to popular prejudice which
often embodies popular notions of what the law ought to be. It has also been
recognized that this fact is not always a weakness but sometimes a great strength
146. The development of the doctrine is traced in the opinion of Rutledge, J., in
President and Directors of Georgetown Hospital v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.Cir. 1942);
James, Inroads on Old Tort Concepts, 15 NACCA L.J. 281, 294 (1955).
147. Leading cases in establishing this rule were Victorian Railways Comm. v. Coultas,
13 A.C. 222 (P.C. 1888); Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897);
Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
148. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (Ex. 1842).
149. Cooperrider, op. cit. supra note 122, at 1308.
150. Id. at 1312.
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of the jury system. Lord Coke is reported to have said "the jurors are Chancel-
lors."' 5 1 Holmes said "one reason why I believe in our practice of leaving ques-
tions of negligence to them is precisely one of their gravest defects from the
point of view of their theoretical function: that they will introduce into their
verdict a certain amount-a very large amount, so far as I have observed-of
popular prejudice, and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with
the wishes and feelings of the community."'152 Pound concluded that "Jury
lawlessness is the great corrective of law in its actual administration."' 153 One of
our ablest trial judges of today has noted that "traditionally juries are the device
by which the rigor of the law is modified pending the enactment of new stat-
utes."'154 Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court believes that "we
would lose more than we would gain by a reform of fact-finding that would only
compel righteous adherence [by juries] to wrong rules. . . . " Until the rules
themselves are changed we are better off "with that quiet distortion that pres-
ently adapts them to the needs of rough justice."'155
It is not, I submit, an improper abdication of responsibility to the jury to
call on its dispensing power-its equitable function-when the occasion is ap-
propriate. Is it not rather an exercise of the best there is in judicial power and
responsibility to determine wisely what occasions are appropriate for the delega-
tion of this function to the jury, and the limits of the delegation? A reasoned
determination that a broad delegation is needed today on the issue of accident
liability may well reflect judicial statesmanship rather than an evasion of
judicial responsibility. I think it does, for the very reasons we have been devel-
oping in these talks. Negligence law and its administrations give an unsatis-
factory answer to the accident problem. We feel, pretty generally, that this is so.
As Holmes said more than sixty years ago "the inclination of a very large part
of the community is to make certain classes of persons insure the safety of those
with whom they deal." Today this inclination has reached the field of motor
accidents. But it has not crystallized enough to lead to political action which
would establish a scheme of social insurance to cover the field. Perhaps it never
will. There are as we have seen, cross currents of opinion. We have not yet made
up our mind where to go. We agree only in our discontent with what we have.
In such a situation it is doubtful whether the courts would be warranted in
trying to give us the comprehensive scheme which in my opinion is needed to
fill the bill-even if they could work out the host of administrative details which
such a scheme would entail. At any rate it is clear that most courts are not now
ready to take such a step. Here then is one of the very cases where there is need
of the flexibility5 6 which the jury trial affords and has traditionally afforded in
151. Quoted from PouND, AN INTRODUCTION To = Pz'rosopr'" or LAW 133 (1922).
152. Horas, COLLECD LEGsr, PAPERS 237-238 (1921).
153. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Amr. L. Rxv. 12, 18 (1910).
154. Wyzanski, op. cit. supra note 130 at 1286.
155. Traynor, Fact Skepticism and the Judicial Process, 106 U.P.L. RIv. 635, 639,
640 (1958).
156. While the jury imparts flexibility to the system, its verdicts are probably not as
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our system at least until such time as we are surer of the ultimate solution
we want.
Three more things should be said:
(1) The fact that wide latitude should be given to juries on the issue of
liability in accident cases does not mean that the same latitude should be given
them in fixing the damages. As I have already suggested, it may well be that
the times demand greater control on this question both by the exercise of dis-
cretionary curbs over the overall amount and by the fashioning of rules of law
which are better adapted to a system in which wrongdoing or fault of the de-
fendant is becoming less and less important.
(2) The fact that wide latitude should be given to juries in accident cases
today does not mean that such latitude should be given to them in other con-
texts today, or in accident cases tomorrow. In commercial, patent, or anti-trust
cases, for example, it is probably desirable to try to make juries do what they
are theoretically supposed to do-follow the court's charge and apply it faith-
fully to the facts as they actually find them. And the same thing may again be
true in accident law if there is a place for juries in it after it has (been com-
prehensively overhauled.
(3) There is a great difference between a reasoned determination to enlarge
the jury's sphere in a certain context after finding it to be appropriate, and a
leaving of issues to a jury merely because that is the easiest thing to do. The
latter is indeed an abdication of judicial responsibility which could scarcely be
charged against such judges as Holmes, Traynor, and Wyzanski. Before such a
charge may properly be leveled against any judge it must be remembered that
reasoning is not always expressed, and indeed a wise decision may be taught by
experience though the grounds for it are never clearly articulated even to the
judge himself. That fact, I think, should not free him from the duty of trying
to think through and to state his grounds, but it may in spite of that free him
from the charge of irresponsibility in his actions.
capricious as its detractors would have us suppose. judge Wyzanski has noted that in tho
Massachusetts District Court officers and attendants can predict verdicts with substantial
accuracy, so great is their uniformity. He adds: "Indeed, their prediction of jury action
is much closer to the ultimate result than their prediction of judicial actions." Supra, note
130 at 1287, note 29. See also Kalven, The Jury, The Law, and The Personal Injury
Damage Award, 19 OH. ST. L.J. 158 (1958).
